Louisiana Law Review
Volume 64
Number 4 Normalization of National Security
Law: A Symposium
Summer 2004

Article 3

8-1-2004

The Role of Military Intelligence in Homeland Security
Stephen Dycus

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev
Part of the Law Commons

Repository Citation
Stephen Dycus, The Role of Military Intelligence in Homeland Security, 64 La. L. Rev. (2004)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol64/iss4/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

The Role of Military Intelligence in Homeland
Security
Stephen Dycus*
I. INTRODUCTION

If, God forbid, the American homeland is struck by another major
terrorist attack, military forces will very likely be involved in the
response. There can be little doubt, for example, that if pneumonic
plague bacilli are released in Chicago and infections result,' the entire
city will have to be quarantined as soon as the contagion is detected.
Nor is there any doubt that troops will be used to enforce the
quarantine. Only the Pentagon and National Guard units have the
personnel, equipment, and training to do the job.
Military forces also may be able to help prevent another attack or
at least reduce its impact. On September 11, 2001, for instance, Air
Force and Air National Guard jets were sent aloft in an unsuccessful
effort to intercept and perhaps shoot down the civilian airliners that
had been commandeered by terrorists.2
Whether in the response to a terrorist attack or in its interdiction,
military intelligence services will directly support the military's use
of force at home, just as they provide information and analysis for
other military activities around the world. But these same military
intelligence services appear poised to assume a much broader
responsibility for domestic counterterrorism. A recent Pentagon
report on the military's role in homeland security notes that while
Copyright 2004, by LouIsIANA LAW REviEW.
The author is a Professor at Vermont Law School. Special thanks are due
to Edward Demetriou, Emily Wetherell, Matthew Einstein, and Byron Kirkpatrick,
all students at Vermont School, for their assistance with research for this article.
1. This scenario was posited in an exercise called TOPOFF 2, sponsored by
the Departments of State and Homeland Security in May 2003. See Dep't of
Homeland Security, Top Officials (TOPOFF) Exercise Series: TOPOFF 2 - After
Action Summary Report (Dec. 19, 2003). Because it was planned and advertised
well in advance, it may have lacked much of the spontaneity and reality of an
earlier, unannounced exercise entitled TOPOFF, which imagined a similar release
in Denver. See Thomas Inglesby, Rita Grossman & Tara O'Toole, A Plague on
Your City: Observationsfrom TOPOFF, 32 Clinical Infectious Diseases 436
(2001), availableathttp://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v32n3/
001347/001347.html; National Response Team, Exercise TOPOFF 2000 and
National Capital Region (NCR): After-Action Report (Aug. 2001).
2. The sequence of events is spelled out in The 9/11 Commission Report:
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States 16-46 (2004). See also Eric Schmitt & Eric Lichtblau, In 149 Minutes,
Transformationto TerrorAge, N.Y. Times, June 18, 2004, at Al.
*
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"terrorism that targets the homeland is fundamentally a law
enforcement matter that is best addressed by domestic law
enforcement entities with DoD in a supporting role during crises, the
Department has a responsibility to protect its forces, capabilities, and
infrastructure within the United States."3 It then goes on to suggest,
however, that "Service and DoD law enforcement/counterintelligence
organizations and NORTHCOM... have leading roles in collecting
and analyzing information and intelligence, and in conducting
investigations and operations to prevent or preempt terrorist attacks."
This view reflects a dramatic change in what we have understood-at
least for the last three decades-to be the "normal" relationship
between the military and the rest of American society.
Before we agree that military intelligence services should play a
more expansive role in our domestic life, several practical questions
need to be addressed. One of the most important questions is whether
such a change would actually make us more secure. Would a more
aggressive use of military intelligence at home make a uniquely
valuable contribution to current counterterrorism efforts of the FBI,
local law enforcement, and other civilian agencies? Or would it be
merely redundant, wasteful, and perhaps even counterproductive?
Another key question is how more expansive military intelligence
activities would affect Americans' privacy and related liberties. If
sacrifices were required, would improvements in security make those
sacrifices worthwhile? If the balance did not clearly favor security,
should the military intelligence services perhaps be barred from
actions that do not directly support the use of military force? If they
are not barred, are there clear legal limits on their activities inside the
United States? Should there be?
These questions are presented in the midst of an unprecedented
effort to organize and harmonize this nation's homeland security
activities. They also arise against the background of a deep-seated
American tradition of avoiding military entanglement in civilian
affairs.
A little history and a brief look at recent developments may help
to provide some answers. In this article we first briefly review the
deeply enshrined antipathy toward involvement of the military in any
aspect of American life. Then we consider the domestic use of
military intelligence services from the American Revolution to the
Vietnam era, when their extensive deployment for political purposes
3. Dep't of Defense, Report to Congress on the Role of the Department of
Defense in Supporting Homeland Security (Sept. 2003), at 9, available at
http://www.dtra.mil/press-resources/publications/deskbook/full-text/AgenciesDocuments/index.cfm [hereinafter Supporting Homeland Security].
4. Id. NORTHCOM is a new military command with primary responsibility
for homeland defense. See infra, text at notes 133-146.
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provoked a public outcry and congressional, as well as executive,
actions to curb them. Next we review legal authorities bearing on this
use, and we trace the development since the mid-1990s of special
measures to prevent or respond to a terrorist attack on the American
homeland. We then consider several current initiatives, responsive
to the ongoing terrorist threat, that may invite or at least permit new
military intelligence intrusions into domestic affairs. Finally, we take
up a modest proposal for new measures that could help strike the
right balance between liberty and security-leaving military
intelligence services free to support the Pentagon's homeland defense
mission, but consigning other aspects of domestic counterterrorism
to non-military
parts of the law enforcement and intelligence
5
communities.
11. THE DOMESTIC USE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE: A VERY
CONCISE HISTORY

A. The Military in American Society: A CautiousEmbrace
In a 1972 case, the Supreme Court referred to the "traditional and
strong resistance of Americans to any military intrusion into civilian
affairs."6 Since the earliest days of the Republic, in fact, Americans
have worried about the risks associated with maintaining a standing
army and more generally with giving the military a prominent role in
civilian life. These concerns were summed up in a 1985 judicial
decision:
Civilian rule is basic to our system of government ....
[M]ilitary enforcement of the civil law leaves the protection
of vital Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights in the hands of
persons who are not trained to uphold these rights. It may
also chill the exercise of fundamental rights, such as the rights
to speak freely and to vote, and create the atmosphere of fear
and hostility which exists in territories occupied by enemy
forces.
The interest of limiting military involvement in civilian
affairs has a long tradition beginning with the Declaration of
5. The Department of Defense distinguishes between "homeland security," a
national effort to prevent or reduce United States vulnerability to terrorist attacks,
or to assist in the recovery from such an attack, and "homeland defense," the
military protection of United States territory, population, and infrastructure against
external threats and aggression. See Steve Bowman, Homeland Security: The
Department of Defense's Role 1-2 (Cong. Res. Serv. Rep. 31-615, 2003). DOD
plays a supporting role in the former, a primary role in the latter. Id. See also
Supporting Homeland Security, supranote 3, at 1.
6. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 2326 (1972).
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Independence and continued in the Constitution, certain acts
of Congress, and decisions of the Supreme Court. The
Declaration of Independence states among the grounds for
severing ties with Great Britain that the King "has kept among
us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without Consent of our
Legislature

. . . [and] has affected to render the Military

independent of and superior to the Civil power." These
concerns were later raised at the Constitutional Convention.
Luther Martin of Maryland said, "when a government wishes
to deprive its citizens of freedom, and reduce them to slavery,
it generally makes use of a standing army."7
To avoid the military excesses spelled out in the Declaration of
Independence, the Framers took care to place overall control of
military forces in the hands of a civilian Commander in Chief. Yet
at the end of the Civil War the Supreme Court warned that even this
precaution might not always suffice:
This nation.., has no right to expect that it will always have
wise and humane rulers, sincerely attached to the principles
of the Constitution. Wicked men, ambitious of power, with
hatred of liberty and contempt of law, may fill the place once
occupied by Washington and Lincoln; and if this right is
conceded, and the calamities of war again befall us, the
dangers to human liberty are frightful to contemplate. 8
The intervention of the judiciary was needed, the Court said, to
preserve a proper balance between the political branches and to
protect the values set out in the Bill of Rights from improper
domestic uses of the military. 9
B. Domestic Use ofMilitaryIntelligencefrom the Founding to the
Modern Era
Despite all these misgivings, military forces, and in particular
military intelligence personnel, have been actively involved in
homeland security from the very beginning. General George
Washington was America's first spymaster. He made extensive use
of espionage, counterintelligence, surveillance, and cryptography
during the Revolutionary War.° These efforts led, for example, to
7.
1985),
8.
9.
10.
7-11.

Bissonette v. Haig, 776 F.2d 1384, 1387, aff'd, 800 F.2d 812 (8th Cir.
aff'd, 485 U.S. 264, 108 S. Ct. 1253 (1988).
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 125 (1866).
Id. at 118-24.
Joan M. Jensen, Army Surveillance in America, 1775-1980 (1991), at
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the unmasking of General Benedict Arnold.11 President Lincoln also
relied heavily on military intelligence during the Civil War. 12
Throughout Reconstruction and afterward, military intelligence
gathering continued at home. Such efforts were not for homeland
defense in the traditional sense, however, but for law enforcement
and political purposes. During the Hayes administration, for
example, Army Signal Corps weather observers collected information
on labor agitators. In World War I the military conducted extensive
domestic surveillance, ostensibly in search of German spies and
saboteurs, although ordinary citizens who objected to wartime
policies or to the war itself were also targeted.' 4 Later the focus
shifted to communists, socialists, and pacifists, while the military
gradually began to share its domestic surveillance responsibilities
with the FBI. 5
C. Keeping an Eye on Things During the Cold War
The National Security Act of 1947 spelled out, among other
things, a structure for overall civilian control of the intelligence
community, 6 of which units controlled by the Pentagon comprise by
far the largest part. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was
named head of the intelligence community and directed to "establish
the requirements and priorities to govern the collection of national
intelligence."' 7 He exercises direct authority only over the CIA,
however.' Congress was careful to state that the DCI should be a
civilian or, if a member of the military', that he would be removed
from the control of his parent service.'
Separately, the 1947 Act provides that the Secretary of Defense
exercises "civilian control" over the military.2 ° In consultation with
11. Id. at 7-9. This earliest history is also recounted in Michael S. Prather,
George Washington, America's First Director of Military Intelligence (2002)
(unpublished masters thesis, Marine Corps Univ.) (on file with author).
12.

Jensen, supranote 10, at 25-28; Christopher H. Pyle, Military Surveillance

of Civilian Politics, 1967-1970 (1986), at 16-17.
13. Pyle, supra note 12, at 18.
14.

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect

to Intelligence Activities, Final Report, S. Rep. No. 94-755 (1976), availableat
http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/reports/book2/contents.htm [hereinafter
Church Committee].
15.

Id.; Jensen, supra note 10, at 201-15.

16. Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495 (1947) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 10 & 50 U.S.C.).
17.
18.
19.
20.

50 U.S.C. §§ 403(a)(1), 403-3(c)(2) (2000).
Id. § 403-3(d).
Id. § 403(c).
Id. § 401.
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the DCI, she manages the operations of DOD intelligence
components. 2 These include the National Security Agency, National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (formerly National Imagery and
Mapping Agency), National Reconnaissance Office, Defense
Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence elements of the three service
branches.22
During the 1950s and 60s, federal troops and federalized National
Guard forces, accompanied by military intelligence personnel, were
deployed to help integrate Southern schools 23 and to help deal with
civil disorders in Detroit in 1967 and other cities the following year
after the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.24 Throughout
this period military intelligence units also continued to collect data on
Americans at home who were suspected of involvement in subversive
activities.25 In the late 1960s, the Pentagon compiled personal
information on more than 100,000 politically active Americans in an
effort to quell civil rights and anti-Vietnam War demonstrations and
to discredit protestors.26 The Army used 1,500 plainclothes agents to
watch demonstrations, infiltrate organizations, and spread
disinformation. 2' According to one report, the Army had at least one
observer at every demonstration of more than twenty people.28
The Army's activities were summed up by Senator Sam Ervin:
Allegedly for the purpose of predicting and preventing
civil disturbances which might develop beyond the control of
state and local officials, Army agents were sent throughout
the country to keep surveillance over the way the civilian
population expressed their sentiments about government
policies. In churches, on campuses, in classrooms, in public
meetings, they took notes, tape-recorded, and photographed
people who dissented in thought, word, or deed. This
21. Id. § 403-5(a).
22. Id. § 403-5(b). The operations of these defense intelligence services are
spelled out in James E. Meason, MilitaryIntelligenceandtheAmerican Citizen, 12
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 541, 547-54 (1989).
23. Jensen, supra note 10, at 237-39.
24. Meason, supra note 22, at 542-43 n.4.
25. This history is set out in considerable detail in ImproperSurveillance of
PrivateCitizens by the Military,part of the report of the Church Committee, supra
note 14, at 785-825, and Pyle, supra note 12. See also Jensen, supranote 10,at
237-47; Meason, supra note 22, at 542-43.
26. Church Committee, supranote 14, at 789; see also Meason, supranote 22,
at 543.
27. MilitarySurveillance: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974) [hereinafter
Military Surveillance Hearings].
28. Pyle, supra note 12, at 186-87.
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included clergymen, editors, public officials, and anyone who
sympathized with the dissenters.
With very few, if any, directives to guide their activities,
they monitored the membership and policies of peaceful
organizations who were concerned with the war in Southeast
Asia, the draft, racial and labor problems, and community
welfare. Out of this surveillance the Army created blacklists
of organizations and personalities which were circulated to
many federal, state, and local agencies, who were all
requested to supplement the data provided. ....
The Army did not just collect and share this information.
Analysts were assigned the task of evaluating and labeling
these people on the basis of reports on their attitudes,
remarks, and activities. They were then coded for entry into
computers or microfilm data banks.2 9
The Defense Department now describes what happened in the
1960s and 70s as
a classic example of what we would today call "mission
creep." What had begun as a simple requirement to provide
basic intelligence to commanders charged with assisting in
the maintenance and restoration of order, had become a
This resulted in the
monumentally intrusive effort.
monitoring of activities of innocent persons involved in the
constitutionally protected expression of their views on civil
rights or anti-war activities. The information collected on
the persons targeted by Defense intelligence personnel was
entered into a national data bank and made available to
civilian law enforcement authorities. This produced a
chilling effect on political expression by those who were
legally working for political change in domestic and foreign
policies.3°
These activities were not widely known until an Army
intelligence officer spelled them out in a dramatic 1970 magazine

29.

Sam J. Ervin, Jr., The First Amendment: A Living Thought in the

ComputerAge, 4 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 13, 37-38 (1972). See also Church
Committee, supra note 14, at 791, 793-94; Meason, supranote 22, at 542-43.
30. Office of the Asst. to the Sec. of Defense (Intelligence Oversight), Mission
andHistory(n.d.), availableathttp://www.dtic.mil/atsdio/mission.html [hereinafter
Mission and History], quoted in Kate Martin, Domestic Intelligence and Civil

Liberties, 24 SAIS Rev. 7, 9 (2004).
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article.3 ' The article provoked several congressional investigations,32
as well as modest reforms outlined below.
It also precipitated an ACLU class-action suit to stop domestic
intelligence collection by the military. The plaintiffs, political
activists, claimed that their First Amendment rights offree expression
and association were "chilled" by Army surveillance and record
collection. They expressed fear that the improper use of information
gathered about their political activities could jeopardize theirjobs and
reputations. They also worried that a far larger number of persons
might simply decide not to speak out, to meet with politically active
persons, or even to subscribe to political publications. When the case
reached the Supreme Court in 1972, the Court ruled that the plaintiffs
lacked standing to sue, because "[a]llegations of a subjective 'chill'
are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective
harm or a threat of specific future harm."3 3
As a practical matter, of course, if an activist lost her job or was
denied a security clearance, she might never learn the reason why.
Personal information in military intelligence files was almost
impossible to obtain in advance of 1974 amendments to the Freedom
of Information Act34 or the passage of the Privacy Act the same
year,35 unless it was used in a criminal prosecution.
In 1976, the Church Committee, looking into a variety of
intelligence community abuses, called the Army program "the worst
intrusion that military intelligence has ever made into the civilian
31. Christopher H. Pyle, Conus Intelligence: The Army Watches Civilian
Politics, 1 Wash. Monthly 4 (1970).
32. FederalDataBanks, Computers,and the Bill of Rights: HearingsBefore
the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971); Staff of the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights, Comm. on the
Judiciary, United States Senate, Army Surveillance of Civilians: A Documentary
Analysis, 92d Cong, 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1972); Report of the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights, Comm. on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Military
Surveillance ofCivilian Politics, 93d Cong, 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1973); Military
Surveillance Hearings,supra note 27.
33. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14, 92 S. Ct. 2318, 2325-26 (1972).
Newly-appointed Justice William H. Rehnquist cast a deciding vote in the 5-4
decision. As Assistant Attorney General, he had argued before a Senate Judiciary
subcommittee the year before that the same suit, then pending in the Court of
Appeals, should be dismissed on standing grounds. Frank Askin, Rehnquist's
Story: ChiefJustice HasHistory of Siding with "Big Brother," Legal Times, July
15, 2002. Asked by Senator Sam Ervin whether "you feel there are any serious
constitutional problems with respect to collecting data on or keeping under
surveillance persons who are merely exercising their right of peaceful assembly or
petition to redress a grievance," Rehnquist answered, "No." Id.
34. Freedom of Information Act and Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502,
88 Stat. 1561 (1974).
35. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000 & Supp. 1 2001)).
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community. 3 6 It proposed a "precisely drawn legislative charter"
that would, interalia,"limit military investigations to activities in the
civilian community which are necessary and pertinent to the military
mission, and which cannot feasibly be accomplished by civilian
agencies."37 Nearly three decades later, however, no such charter has
been adopted.
II. EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSES TO THE "WORST
INTRUSION"

The end of the Vietnam War marked a significant change in the
relationship of trust that had long existed between the executive
branch, Congress, and the American people. Publication of the
Pentagon Papers, the Watergate scandal, and revelations about illegal
domestic spying and disruption of political organizations all added to
concerns over the military intelligence abuses outlined above.
Congress reacted by passing several constraints on domestic (and
foreign) intelligence activities. The President then adopted even
broader regulations in an effort to forestall further legislative
activism. These developments are described briefly below, along
with the Pentagon's own relevant regulations and an important
background principle that has shaped thinking in this area-the Posse
Comitatus Act. Our objective here is to consider whether these
statutory and executive initiatives are likely to prevent the kinds of
military intelligence abuses that the Church Committee complained
about.
A. Legislative Limits on Domestic Intelligence Collection
In 1974, Congress addressed domestic intelligence excesses, both
military and civilian, by passing the Privacy Act." In 1978, it passed
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),3 9 which now
describes the "exclusive means" for electronic surveillance (if not for
other kinds of intelligence collection) by any government agency if a
Title III warrant is not obtained. 4' The efficacy of these statutes in
36. Church Committee, supra note 14, at 792.
37. Id.at310-11.
38. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000 & Supp. I 2001). The workings of the Act are
spelled out in United States Dept. of Justice, Office of Information and Privacy,
Freedom of Information Act Guide and Privacy Act Overview 775-949 (2002);
Litigation Under the Federal Open Government Laws 303-344,417-437 (Harry A.
Hammitt, David L. Sobel & Mark S. Zaid, eds., 21st ed. 2002).
39. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1829 (2000 & Supp. 12001).

40. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) (2000). "Title III" refers to the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act, id. §§ 2510-2520 (2000), which sets out the
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discouraging the improper collection and use of information about
individuals and organizations by the military is, however, far from
clear.41
The Privacy Act generally forbids the maintenance by an agency
of any record "describing how any individual exercises rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment unless expressly authorized by
statute or... unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized
law enforcement activity. '42 "Individual" for this purpose means a
United States citizen or an alien "lawfully admitted for permanent
residence."43 Similar provisions in FISA bar electronic surveillance
or physical searches of a United States person "solely upon the basis
of activities protected by the first amendment."' It might be argued,
however, that military intelligence services could legally listen in on
a private conversation about the National Rifle Association or the
environmental group Greenpeace on grounds that the collection was
not "solely" based on the exercise of First Amendment rights.
The Privacy Act also bars the maintenance of personal
information by an agency unless it is "relevant and necessary to
accomplish a purpose of the agency required to be accomplished by
statute or by executive order of the President."45 Military intelligence
agencies are plainly charged by Executive Order No. 12,333 with
collection of information concerning foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence,' and they are impliedly authorized by FISA to do
the same. FISA does require agencies to follow procedures to
"minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the
dissemination" of nonpublic information about United States
persons,4 7 except that evidence of a crime may be disseminated for
law enforcement purposes.4 8 The minimization procedures are
procedure forjudicial authorization of electronic surveillance for the investigation,
prevention, and prosecution of serious crimes.
41. Regarding application of the Privacy Act to military intelligence activities
in this country, see generally Paul M. Peterson, CivilianDemonstrationsNearthe
MilitaryInstallation:Restraintson Military Surveillance and Other Intelligence
Activities, 140 Mil.L. Rev. 113, 130-44 (1993). Uncertainty about implementation
of FISA generally is traced in William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive
AuthorityforNationalSecurity Surveillance,50 Am. U. L. Rev. 1 (2001).
42. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7) (2000). The history of this provision and
controversy surrounding it are described in Steven W. Becker, MaintainingSecret
GovernmentDossierson the FirstAmendment Activities ofAmerican Citizens: The
Law Enforcement Activity Exception to the PrivacyAct, 50 DePaul L. Rev. 675

(2000).
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(2) (2000).
50 U.S.C. §§ 1805(a)(3)(A), 1824(a)(3)(A) (2000).
Id. § 552a(e)(1).
46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (1981).
50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h), 1805(a)(4), 1805(b)(2) (2000).
Id. § 1801(h)(3).
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classified, however, so it is not possible to know precisely what kinds
of personal data may be collected, retained, or shared pursuant to a
FISA order.49
Another Privacy Act provision that is relevant here prohibits the
transfer of personal information to other agencies without the consent
of the subject, except, inter alia,for a "routine use" by the transferee
agency that is "compatible with the purpose for which it was
collected. 5 0 Thus, military intelligence services should not expect to
receive data that were collected by other agencies for reasons having
no bearing on DOD's homeland defense mission. But the Church
Committee in 1976 thought the Privacy Act did not bar the military
from directly gathering intelligence that is not "relevant" in order to
supply it to other agencies.'
Individuals about whom information is collected generally have
a right under the Privacy Act to ins ect agency files and correct any
errors about them in those files, and to review any record of
disclosures,53 unless, inter alia, the information is properly
classified.54 Yet it may be exceedingly difficult to determine whether
such information is in fact properly classified or, for that matter,
whether it even exists."
The Privacy Act does require that intelligence agents collecting
personal data from human sources identify themselves to potential
informants, state the authority for the collection, and describe the uses
to which the data will be put.5 6 A provision of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 that would have amended the
Privacy Act to allow military intelligence personnel to work
undercover was defeated. 7
The E-Government Act of 2002 requires federal government
agencies to prepare "privacy impact assessments" before they develop
or procure new information technology or initiate any new collections
of personally identifiable information.58 An assessment must address
what information is to be collected, how it will be collected, its
intended use, with whom the information will be shared, and what
notice, if any, will be provided to individuals described in the

49. See Banks & Bowman, supranote 41, at 89.
50. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(b)(3), (a)(7) (2000).
51. Church Committee, supra note 14, at 834.
52. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d).
53. Id. § 552a(c)(3).
54. Id. § 552a(k)(1).
55. Those difficulties are outlined in Litigation Under the Federal Open
Government Laws, supra note 38.
56. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(3) (2000).
57. S.2386, 108th Cong. § 502 (2004).
58. Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 208(b)(1), 116 Stat. 2899, 2921 (2002).
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information.5 9 Hope that this new law might bring a measure of
transparency to the compilation of personalized computer data must
be tempered by the fact that impact assessments need only be made
public "if practicable,"' and that even this requirement may be
"modified or waived for security reasons, or to protect classified,
sensitive, or private information contained in an assessment."" The
terms "practicable," "security," and "sensitive" are not defined.
If the collection, use, or transfer of some personal information
cannot be revealed because disclosure of either the process or the
information itself would jeopardize national security, compliance
with the law should at least be subject to non-public oversight
procedures. In 1980, Congress amended the National Security Act of
1947 to require the DCI and heads of all entities involved in
intelligence activities, including the Defense Department, to keep the
House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence "fully and
currently informed" of these activities.62 In 1991, in response to the
63
Iran-Contra Affair, the President was given the same responsibility.
The two congressional committees provide the only systematic
oversight outside of the executive branch.
Will these different legislative initiatives reliably curb the kind of
abuses by military intelligence witnessed during the Vietnam era?
Maybe. Will they prevent unnecessary abridgements of civil liberties
by military intelligence using computer technology that members of
the Church Committee could not even have imagined thirty years
ago? Probably not. Nor, it appears, will executive measures
necessarily do so.
B. Executive Measures to Guide Domestic Intelligence Collection
Amid growing efforts by Congress to curb executive excesses and
to play a more active role in intelligence, the Reagan administration
in 1981 issued Executive Order No. 12,333. 64 In 2004, it is still the
basic executive charter for United States intelligence activities. It
includes a broad directive to collect intelligence "needed by" the
Secretary of Defense "for the performance of [his] duties and
responsibilities., 65
The Secretary of Defense is specifically
59. Id. § 208(b)(2)(B)(ii).
60. Id. § 208(b)(1)(B)(iii).
61. Id. § 208(b)(1)(C).
62. Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-450, § 407(b), 94 Stat.
1975, 1981 (1980) (amended 1991).
63. Intelligence Authorization Act,Fiscal Year 1991, Pub.L.No.102-88,§ 602,
105 Stat. 429,441 (1991) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 413(a)(1) (2000)).
64. 46 Fed.Reg.59,941 (1981).
65. Id. § 1.4(a).
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authorized to collect national foreign intelligence and to conduct
counterintelligence at home in cooperation with the FBI,6 6 but not
"for the purpose of acquiring information concerning the domestic
activities of United States persons. 67 On the other hand, the Order
permits the collection, retention, and dissemination of
"[i]nformation needed to protect the. safety of any persons or
organizations.""
Concerning collection techniques, military
intelligence services may conduct electronic surveillance but
generally not physical searches of United States persons inside the
United States.69 Thus, Executive Order 12,333 is an uncertain guide
for military intelligence activities that purports to authorize much
but forbid little. Still, it expressly disclaims any authority for acts
that would violate the Constitution or statutes, including,
presumably, the Posse Comitatus Act, described below."
Within the executive branch, oversight is conducted by the
Intelligence Oversight Board7' for the entire intelligence community
72
and by Inspectors General for most elements of the community.
The Pentagon also has an Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence Oversight, whose job is to monitor intelligence
activities 7worldwide
and investigate questions of their legality or
3
propriety.
After the terrorist bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, President Clinton issued
several executive orders dealing with counterterrorism and critical
infrastructure protection. 4 These were drawn together and restated
66.

Id. § 1.11(a), (d).

67.

Id. § 2.3(b).

68.
69.

Id. § 2.3(d).
Id. § 2.4. Physical searches may, however, be conducted of military

personnel. Id. § 2.4(b).
70. Id. § 2.8.
71. The Intelligence Oversight Board is a part of the Executive Office of the
President. See Executive Order No. 12,863, 58 Fed. Reg. 48,441 (1993); Executive
Order No. 13,301, 68 Fed. Reg. 26,981 (2003).
72. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. App. §§ 1-7, 8H, 11 (2000 & Supp. 12001) (Defense
Intelligence Agency).
73. Department of Defense Directive 5148.11, Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence Oversight,
4 (May 21, 2004), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/5148-1.pdf; Remarks by George B. Lotz II,
Asst. to the Sec. of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) to the Technology and Privacy
Advisory Comm., July 22, 2003, available at www.sainc.com/tapac/bios/
GeorgeLotz.pdf. This office was established in response to the domestic abuses by
Army Intelligence during the 1960s. See Mission and History,supra note 30.
74. Presidential Decision Directive 39 (June 21, 1995), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm (heavily redacted) (official summary
available at http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/pdd-39.htm) (setting out United States
counterterrorism policy in broad terms); Presidential Decision Directive 62 (1998)
(Fact Sheet available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd-62.htm) (describing
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in 2000 in the United States Government Interagency Domestic
Concept of Operations Plan (CONPLAN),75 giving lead agency
responsibility to the FBI and Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), respectively, for crisis and consequence
management.76 DOD (including, presumably, its intelligence
components) is slated for a supporting role in each instance; it may
also assist in threat assessment and provide operational and tactical
support.1 7 FEMA's Federal Response Plan likewise describes the
Pentagon as playing a supporting role,7 8 as do the Defense
Department's own regulations for responding to civil disturbances. 79
More recently, the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland
Security indicated that military support to civil authorities may take
the form of "providing technical support and assistance to law
enforcement; assisting in the restoration of law and order; loaning
specialized equipment; and assisting in consequence
management."8 ° Presidential Directive/HSPD-5,81 issued in 2003,
and a new National Response Plan,82 currently under development
by the Department of Homeland Security, generally continue this
alignment.83
leadership of counterterrorism efforts); Presidential Decision Directive 63 (May
22, 1998), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd-63.htm (setting out
policy for protection of nation's critical infrastructure).
75. United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of
available at http://www.fema.gov/
Operations Plan (2000),
pdf/rrr/conplan/conplan.pdf [hereinafter CONPLAN].
76. "Crisis management is predominantly a law enforcement function"
concerned with anticipating, preventing, or resolving a terrorist threat or act. Id. at
7. "Consequence management is predominantly an emergency management
function . . .to protect public health and safety, restore essential government
services, and provide emergency relief." Id. at 8. Confusion about overlapping
agency responsibilities led to abandonment of these functional distinctions after the
9/11 attacks. See Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland
Security 42 (July 2002) [hereinafter National Strategy].
77. CONPLAN, supra note 75, at 4. See alsoJeffrey Brake, Terrorism and the
Military's Role in Domestic Crisis Management: Background and Issues for
Congress (Cong. Res. Serv. Rep. 30-938, 2001).
78. FEMA, Federal Response Plan, Terrorism Incident Annex, availableat
http://www.fema.gov/rrr/frp/ ("the Department of Defense (DOD) will activate
technical operations capabilities to support the Federal response to threats or acts
of WMD terrorism.").
79. See infra, text at notes 93-105.
80. National Strategy, supranote 76, at 44.
81. Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5, Management of
Domestic Incidents (Feb. 28, 2003), available at http://www.fema.gov/
pdf/reg-ii/hspd_5.pdf [hereinafter HSPD-5].
82. See U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, Initial National Response Plan (Sept.
available at http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/
2003),
30,
assetlibrary/InitialNRP_ 100903.pdf [hereinafter Initial National Response Plan].
83. HSPD-5, supranote 81, at (9); Initial National Response Plan, supranote
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Yet some have argued that in a great crisis the President ought to
be prepared to deploy military forces at home in a lead role.84 Either
way, military intelligence services will necessarily be involved.
Does this welter of executive measures provide sufficient clarity
and adequate flexibility to respond to the threat of global terrorism?
Do provisions for military intelligence activities at home strike a
proper balance between security and liberty? Do they provide
sufficient transparency and accountability to ensure compliance with
them? Uncertainty about the answers to these questions makes us
less secure and, possibly, less free.
C. The Posse ComitatusAct as a BackgroundPrinciple
The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act expressly forbids the use of
military forces to "execute the laws," except when expressly
authorized by the Constitution or a statute.85 It has long been thought
to limit most military involvement in civilian law enforcement. 86 The
Church Committee concluded in 1976 that the Act "would probably
prevent the military from conducting criminal investigations of

civilians, but... would not bear upon other types of investigations. ' ' 87

Since that time, however, Congress has enacted an exception to the
Act that allows the Secretary of Defense to provide law enforcement
officials with "any information collected during the normal course of
military training or operations that may be relevant to a violation of
any Federal or State law," and to take the needs of such officials into
82, at 2.
84. See, e.g., National Comm'n on Terrorism (Bremer Comm'n), Countering
the Changing Threat of International Terrorism 39 (2000) ("[I]n extraordinary
circumstances, when a catastrophe is beyond the capabilities of local, state, and
other federal agencies ... the President may want to designate DoD as a lead
federal agency."); Ashton B. Carter, John M. Deutch & Philip D. Zelikow,
Catastrophic Terrorism: Elements of a National Policy (Preventive Defense
Project Occasional Paper, vol. 1, no. 6, 1998), available at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/visions/terrorism.htm (DOD primacy inevitable). But
see Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities to Terrorism
Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Gilmore Comm'n), Second Annual
Report, Towarda NationalStrategyfor CombatingTerrorism28 (2000), available
at http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/terror2.pdf (President should "always
designate a Federal civilian agency other than the Department of Defense (DoD) as
the Lead Federal Agency").
85. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000).
86. The Act and its application are described in Sean J. Kelly, Reexamining the
Posse Comitatus Act: Toward a Right to Civil Law Enforcement, 21 Yale L. &
Pol'y Rev. 383 (2003); Matthew Carlton Hammond, Note, The Posse Comitatus
Act: A Principlein Need ofRenewal, 75 Wash. U. L.Q. 953 (1997); Charles Doyle,
The Posse Comitatus Act & Related Matters: The Use of the Military to Execute
Civilian Law (Cong. Res. Serv. Rep. 95-964, 1995).
87. Church Committee, supra note 14, at 833.
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account "to the maximum extent practicable" in the planning and
execution of military training or operations.88 The Secretary may also
furnish equipment to law enforcement agencies, along with personnel
to operate it, for cases involving foreign or domestic counterterrorism
or violation of "[a]ny law, foreign or domestic, prohibiting terrorist
activities."89
Other statutory exceptions to the Act are potentially much
broader. The Stafford Act, for example,.gives the President authority
to use the armed services in an emergency to perform work "essential
for the preservation of life and property." 90 The Insurrection statutes
at 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-335 give the President wide latitude to use
troops for almost any purpose, including law enforcement, in
responding to an actual or threatened terrorist attack. Another statute
allows military forces to assist the Justice Department in collecting
intelligence or in searches and seizures when it is "necessary for the
immediate protection of human life."9 '
These statutory exceptions, designed to furnish maximum
flexibility to the executive branch in an emergency, are most striking
for their failure to include any meaningful limits-temporal,
geographical, or situational-or any means for challenging their
invocation. Taken together, they appear to remove any significant
Posse Comitatus Act constraints on domestic military intelligence
activities. Yet the applicability of the Act has been a source of some
confusion, and President Bush, in his 2002 National Strategy for
Homeland Security, called for a "thorough review of the laws
permitting the military to act within the United States.9 2
D. The Pentagon'sOwn Regulations
What does the Pentagon believe to be the scope and limits of its
domestic intelligence authority? The official answer is contained in
88. 10 U.S.C. § 371 (2000).
89. 10 U.S.C. §§ 372, 374 (2000). A related statute barring military personnel
from participation in a "search, seizure, arrest, or similar activity unless ...
otherwise authorized by law," 10 U.S.C. § 375 (2000), has been held by one court
not to prevent the Naval Intelligence Service from sharing with civilian police
information collected in its surveillance of criminal drug activity. Hayes v. Hawes,
921 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1990).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 5170b(c) (2000). If the Stafford Act is not, in the strictest
sense, an exception to the Posse Comitatus Act, see Operational Law Handbook
(2004) (Joseph E. Berger, Derek Grimes & Eric T. Jensen eds., 2003), at 369,
availableathttps://www.jagcnet.army.mil/laawsxxi/cds.nsf [hereinafter Operational
Law Handbook], it is drawn in terms sufficiently broad to allow virtually any action
that otherwise would be prohibited.
91. 10 U.S.C. § 382 (2000).
92. National Strategy, supra note 76, at 48.
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several DOD directives, some of them written long before the threat
of international terrorism became a top priority for the defense
community. 93
Two in particular are important here. One directive orders that all
DOD intelligence activities "be carried out in strict conformity with
the U.S. Constitution, applicable law, E.O. 12,333 [and] other DoD
Directives, with special emphasis given to thearotection of the
constitutional rights and privacy of U.S. persons.
A second, DOD Directive 5240.1 -R, sets out fifteen procedures
for domestic surveillance of U.S. persons by military intelligence
components. It is described in the Army Judge Advocates'
Operational Law Handbook as "the sole authority for DoD
intelligence components to collect, retain, and disseminate
intelligence concerning U.S. persons. 95 One of these procedures
provides that covert collection is permitted only if "significant"
foreign intelligence is sought, the head of the military agency
approves, the information is not reasonably obtainable through overt
means, and collection is coordinated with the FBI.9 6 In addition, the
information collected must not concern the "domestic activities" of
any United States person,97 here defined as activities that "do not
involve a significant connection with a foreign power, organization,
or person."9 Other procedures contain very broad authorization for
retention and dissemination of data. 99 Electronic surveillance, as well
as "concealed monitoring," must follow Executive Order 12,333,00
while physical searches are authorized only against current military
personnel. l0 1 Human intelligence collection may be carried out only
against prospective, current, or former military personnel or
contractors. 102 Undisclosed collection from a domestic organization
93. Dep't of Defense Directive 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil
Authorities (Feb. 27, 1997); Dep't of Defense Directive 5240.1, DoD Intelligence
Activities (Apr. 25, 1988) [hereinafter DOD Directive 5240.11; Dep't of Defense
Directive 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence
Components That Affect United States Persons (Dec. 1982) [hereinafter DOD
Directive 5240.1-R]; Dep't of Defense Directive 5200.27, Acquisition of
Information Concerning Persons and Organizations Not Affiliated with the
Department of Defense (Jan. 7, 1980). These directives are available at
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/dirl .html
or
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/dir2.html.
94. DOD Directive 5240.1, supranote 93, at 4.1.
95. Operational Law Handbook, supranote 90, at 262 (emphasis in original).
96. DOD Directive 5240.1-R, supra note 93, at Proc. 2, [E.
97. Id.at Proc. 2, V'E.1.
98. Id. at Proc. 2, B.3.
99. Id. at Procs. 3 and 4.
100. Id. at Procs. 5 and 6.
101. Id.at Proc.7.
102. Id. at Proc. 9, C.1.
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is barred, °3 while cooperation with law enforcement officials is
permitted in the investigation of international terrorist activities."
These procedures appear to limit the collection of United States
person data in some instances beyond even what other authorities
Still, they provide neither transparency nor
might permit.
accountability to anyone outside the military. 1"5
IV. AN EVOLVING DOMESTIC ROLE FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have led to the
development of new strategies for protecting the American homeland.
Military forces, including their intelligence components, are heavily
involved in some of them. For example, the Pentagon reports that the
recently established
Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA) Joint Intelligence Task
Force-Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT) is DoD's lead
national-level intelligence organization for indications and
warning, the production of timely all-source intelligence,
integration of national-level analytic efforts on all aspects of
the terrorist threat, and development and maintenance of an
accurate, up-to-date knowledge base on terrorism-related
information. The Director, JITF-CT also serves as the DoD
focal point and senior Defense Intelligence representative
within the Intelligence Community (IC) for terrorist threat
warning, proposing and coordinating within the IC
promulgation of such warnings to appropriate DoD
organizations and combatant commands. The JITF-CT
mission continues to evolve in consonance with other
organizations involved in homeland defense/security,
including NORTHCOM and the Department of Homeland
Security, as an appropriate division of labor is worked out and
as working relationships and data-sharing arrangements are
established. "
That evolving division of labor and those working relationships and
data-sharing arrangements are the subject of this section.
103. Id.atProc. 10,IC.l.b.
104. Id.atProc. 12, B.l.a.
105. Procedure 15 of DOD Directive 5240.1-R directs Inspectors General and
General Counsels of the various intelligence components to seek out and investigate
"uestionable activities," but it offers no protection for whistleblowers. Id.at Proc.
106. Supporting Homeland Security, supranote 3, at 9-10. See also Dep't of
Defense Directive 2000.12, DoD Antiterrorism(AT) Program(Aug. 18, 2003), at
Encl. 4, available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html2/
d200012x.htm.
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Here we review the Pentagon's domestic collaboration with two
new counterterrorism institutions, one statutory and one created by
executive fiat, along with a new DOD command structure devoted to
homeland defense. We also consider DOD's role in the creation of
new technology that could help thwart another terrorist attack.
Finally, we look at a recent change in the management of military
intelligence components. Our job here, as earlier, is to consider
whether these developments are likely to make us safer without
unnecessarily compromising core American values of privacy.
A. The Pentagon'sRelation to the Departmentof Homeland
Security
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 creates a new program, the
Directorate for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
(IAIP),' 7' that is "singularly focused on the protection of the
American homeland against terrorist attack."' 8 Its mission is to
"access, receive, and analyze law enforcement information,
intelligence information, and other information from agencies of the
Federal Government, State and local government agencies... and
private sector entities," to integrate that information, and then to
disseminate it to the same agencies and entities."
Those
agencies-both collectors and consumers of information-include the
military intelligence services. " 0
The Act authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security to enter
into cooperative agreements with heads of other agencies, such as
DIA, to detail personnel to the IAIP Directorate to perform "analytic
107.

Pub. L. No. 107-296, §201, 116 Stat. 2135, 2145-2147 (2002).

108. Letter from Thomas J. Ridge, Secretary, Dep't of Homeland Security et al.
to Senators Susan M. Collins and Carl Levin (Apr. 13, 2004), available at
http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/supporting/2004/041304TTICresponse.pdf
[hereinafter Letter from Thomas J. Ridge].
109. Pub. L. No. 107-296, §201(d), 116 Stat. 2135, 2145-2148 (2002). Some
details of IAIP's operations are set forth in The DepartmentofHomelandSecurity's
InformationAnalysis and InfrastructureProtectionBudget Proposalfor Fiscal
Year 2005: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Infrastructureand Border
Security and the Subcomm. on Intelligence and Counterterrorismof the House
Select Comm. on Homeland Security, 108th Cong. (Mar. 4, 2004) (testimony of
Frank Libutti, Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection). A critique of the Directorate may be found at
Democratic Members of the House Select Comm. on Homeland Security, America
at Risk: Closing the Security Gap 1-11 (Feb. 2004).
110. Not all data will be shared with every contributing entity. Classified
information and sources, for example, cannot be revealed to state and local law
enforcement agencies or first responders, and such data should not be given to other
federal officials who have no legitimate need for it. See Bowman, supranote 5, at
3.
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functions and related duties.""' Thus, military personnel may furnish
as well as receive a variety of information while serving with the
IAIP.
The Defense Science Board has urged DOD to share with DHS
(and also with the Justice Department and the CIA) "the entire
repository of information" available to it, not just "traditionally
shared intelligence."' " 2 It reasons that "DoD has information other
than traditional foreign intelligence that is essential for others
engaged in homeland security,"' although it does not indicate what
that information might be. It also suggests that "DoD requires
information from others, such as providers of domestic intelligence,
in order to execute its homeland defense and homeland security
responsibilities," but it proposes no limits on the scope ofinformation
received. "'

While the Homeland Security Act expresses the "sense of
Congress" that nothing in it "should be construed to alter the
applicability" of the Posse Comitatus Act," 5 there is no other
reference in the 2002 legislation to any limits on the military's
domestic collection and use of personal information.
In a move to clarify and implement the statute, Homeland
Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5, issued in 2003, provides that
the Secretary of Homeland Security is to be the "principal Federal
official for domestic incident management" and is to coordinate the
actions of other agencies involved."t6 The directive also specifies that
the Attorney General is to have "lead responsibility for criminal
investigations of terrorist acts or ...threats,""' 7 while the Secretary

of Defense is directed to furnish support to civil authorities for
domestic incidents." 8 DHS is currently developing a National
Response Plan to replace the earlier Federal Response Plan and
CONPLAN. 1 19

DHS is unique among agencies in having statutorily mandated20
oversight offices for privacy and for civil rights and civil liberties.
These offices may provide a public window into at least some of
DOD'sintelligence services as they interact with the new department.
111. Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 201(f), 116 Stat. 2135, 2148 (2002).
112. Defense Science Board, DoD Roles and Missions in Homeland Security
9-10 (Nov. 2003).
113. Id. at 10.
114. Id.
115. Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 886, 116 Stat. 2135, 2248 (2002).
116. HSPD-5, supra note 81, at (4).
117. ld. at (8).
118. Id. at (9).
119. Initial National Response Plan, supra note 82.
120. Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 222 and 705, 116 Stat. 2135, 2155 and 2219
(2002), respectively.
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B. JTIC: Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen?
The Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), announced in
President Bush's 2003 State of the Union message, is supposed to
help avoid the apparent breakdown in information-sharing among
agencies that preceded 9/11.121 It has "the primary responsibility in
the [U.S. government] for terrorism analysis (except information
relating to purely domestic terrorism) and is responsible for the dayto-day terrorism analysis provided to the President and other senior
policymakers."'' 22 It is intended to "close the 'seam' between
analysis of foreign and domestic intelligence on terrorism"12 3 and to
serve as the government's "hub for all terrorist threat-related
analytic work."1 24 TTIC does not actively gather intelligence but
instead compiles what is collected by various members of the
intelligence community and disseminates it again to those members.
It may, however, direct the collection of information by other
agencies. 25 According to its Director, "TTIC has the primary
responsibility for terrorism analysis at the national level. Each of
the other elements has responsibility for doing analysis in support
of their respective missions and operational requirements."
It
also maintains a database of known and suspected
terrorists
that
is
27
available to federal and non-federal officials.
Because it looks at foreign as well as domestic terrorist threats,
TTIC may have a broader "customer base" than the Department of
Homeland Security's Directorate of Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection (IAIP), described above. Regarding
domestic threats from foreign sources, however, TTIC may be
largely redundant (although it expands the domestic intelligence
121. See News Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: Strengthening
Intelligence to Better Protect America (Jan. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-12.html [hereinafter
White House News Release]. TTIC is described in considerable detail in Letter
from John 0. Brennan, Director, Terrorist Threat Integration Center, to Rep. John
Conyers, Jr. 10-11 (Dec. 4, 2003), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/
ttic/qfrl20403.pdf [hereinafter Letter from John 0. Brennan].
122. Letter from Thomas J. Ridge, supra note 108, at 1.
123. White House News Release, supra note 121.
124. White House Offers New Detailson Terrorism ThreatIntegrationCenter,
Inside the Pentagon, Feb. 20, 2003.
125. Letter from John 0. Brennan, supra note 121, at 40.
126. Law Enforcement and the IntelligenceCommunity: PanelI ofthe Tenth
Hearingbefore Nat'l Comm 'n on TerroristAttacks Upon the United States (Apr.
14, 2004) (statement of John 0. Brennan), available at
http://www.9-11 commission.gov/archive/hearing 10/9-11 CommissionHearing_2
004-04-14.pdf.
127. Letter from John 0. Brennan, supra note 121, at 42.
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role of the DCI), and it may actually have hampered the
128
establishment of IAIP as the main entity to "connect the dots."'
More troubling, "there is still confusion within the federal
government and among state and local governments about the
respective roles of the TTIC, TSC [the FBI's Terrorist Screening
Center], and the Information Analysis (IA) component of IAIP.' 2
A Senate committee complained recently that
[a]lthough TTIC was established to bring intelligence data
from across the Intelligence Community together at one
location, many analysts at TTIC are still burdened by the
same information restrictions that inhibited their work at
their parent agency-working under a collage of
minimization procedures, parent organization legal
authorities and policy barriers, and perceived limitations that
still inhibit real all-source intelligence analysis. 3 '
The committee may have been referring to the military intelligence
services, with which TTIC interacts strongly. About one-quarter of
TTIC's staff will be furnished by DOD, including representatives
from the Defense Intelligence Agency, National-Geospatial
Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency working in its
offices.' 3 '
Military intelligence personnel are both suppliers and recipients
of information in this setting, and they may become involved in the
traffic of personal data that have no relevance to the military's
homeland defense mission. Aside from DOD's own regulations,
there may be no constraints on this traffic, since TTIC lacks
legislative limits, an oversight machinery of its own, or a charter
that would impose such constraints. 132

128. Democratic Members of the House Select Comm. on Homeland Security,
supra note 109, at 2; but cf. Letter from John 0. Brennan, supra note 121, at 18.
129. Office of Inspector General, Dept. of Homeland Security, Review of the
Status of Department of Homeland Security Efforts to Address Its Major
Management Challenges 23 (Mar. 2004). See also Democratic Members of the
House Select Comm. on Homeland Security, supranote 109, at 1-2.
130. S. Rep. No. 108-258 (2004), available at http://www.fas.org/
irp/congress/2004_rpts 108-258.html.
131. Letter from John 0. Brennan, supra note 121, at 10-11. See also
Supporting Homeland Security, supra note 3, at 11.
132. See The TerroristThreat IntegrationCenter (7TIC) and Its Relationship
with the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security: Hearing Before the
House Comm. on the Judiciaryand House Select Comm. on Homeland Security,
108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Jerry Berman, Pres., Center for Democracy &
Technology), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/berman072203.pdf;
Letter from John 0. Brennan, supra note 121, at 41.
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C. NORTHCOM: ReorganizingforHomeland Security
When the Pentagon announced in early 2002 that it was creating a
new Northern Command (NORTHCOM) based in Colorado 33 to assist
in homeland defense, it said its mission would be restricted to
protecting America from foreign adversaries and assisting civilian
authorities in recovering from another terrorist attack at home."3
While that mission gives it "a strong rationale for access to information
collected by various intelligence and law enforcement agencies, 1 135 it
also raises questions about safeguards on the use of that information.
In fact, NORTHCOM has its own extensive domestic intelligence
operation. NORTHCOM intends to collect and "fuse intelligence and
law enforcement information" and then disseminate it to "a wide
spectrum of users that consist of folks from first responders all the way
up the national command authority."' 36 To this end, personnel from the
FBI, CIA, NSA, DIA, and other intelligence agencies maintain offices
at NORTHCOM and receive daily briefings on potential terrorist
threats.'37 In at least some respects, this function of NORTHCOM

appears to substantially duplicate the activities of both TTIC and the
Department of Homeland Security's IAIP.' 38
NORTHCOM is also involved in direct intelligence collection.
General Ralph Eberhart, NORTHCOM's commander, has stated, "we
are not going to be out there spying on people," but added, "we get
information from people who do."' He may have been referring to a
new Pentagon organization called Counterintelligence Field Activity
(CIFA).a° CIFA is charged to maintain "a domestic law enforcement
133. Some information about the new command may be found at
http://www.northcom.nil.
134. See U.S. Northern Command, Who We Are-Mission (n.d.), at
http://www.northcom.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=s.whomission.
135. Christopher Bolkcom et al., Homeland Security: Establishment and
Implementation of Northern Command 5 (Cong. Res. Serv. Rep. RS21322, 2003),
availableat http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RS21322.pdf.
136. Homeland Defense: Old Force Structuresfor New Missions: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on NationalSecurity, Veterans'Affairs, and Int'l Relations
of the House Comm. on Govt. Reform, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Edward
Anderson III, Dep. Comm., U.S. Northern Command, Northern Aerospace Defense
Command), available at 2003 WL 2008258 (F.D.C.H.). See also Jim McGee &
Caitlin Harrington, In the Mountainsof Colorado,the PentagonGrowsa Big New
HomelandIntelligence Center, CQ.com, Oct. 22, 2003.
137. Kaye Spector, Military CommanderAims to Stay StepsAhead of Potential
Terrorism,The Plain Dealer (Cleveland), Apr. 6, 2004, at A8.
138. See supra,text at notes 108-119 and 121-127.
139. Interview by Dan Sagalyn with Ralph Eberhart, on "The News Hour," PBS
(Sept. 27, 2002), available at http://www.pbs.orglnewshour/terrorisml
ata/eberhart.html.
140. CIFA was established by Dep't of Defense Dir. 5105.67, DoD
Counterintelligence Field Activity

(Feb.

19,

2002),

available at
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database that includes information related to potential terrorist threats
directed against the Department of Defense."' 4 ' It also has a "clear-cut
intelligence analysis responsibility, which includes the fusion of
intelligence, law enforcement, and other domestic (e.g., medical)
information into all-source, predictive, and actionable threat
assessments."' 142 CIFA is engaged in "close collaboration and
partnering with other organizations in the national intelligence and
investigative community," for example, by furnishing a
counterintelligence support team to the FBI.143 Moreover, it has been
directed to develop a data mining capability that may resemble the
much maligned Total Information Awareness program, described
below."
In March 2004, the Wall Street Journal reported that a CIFA agent
sought a videotape of a University of Texas Law School conference
attended by "three Middle Eastern men" who had made "suspicious
remarks."'145 The Army later called that request "inappropriate. 146
What the Army has not yet done is to spell out clearly what kinds of
data can appropriately be collected by CIFA, how they will be
collected, and the uses to which they will be put.
D. Total InformationAwareness and Its Progeny
Many were wary when John Poindexter14' appeared in 2002 as
head of a new program at the Pentagon's Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) called Total Information Awareness

http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d5105_67.htm.
141. Dep't of Defense Dir. 2000.12, DoD Antiterrorism(AT) Program,Encl. 6,
E6.1.2 (Aug. 18, 2003), available at http://www.dtic.mi/whs/directives/
corres/html/200012.htm.
142. Supporting Homeland Security, supra note 3, at 11.
143. Id. at 10.
144. Id. at IE6.1.5.
145. Robert Block & Gary Fields, Is Military Creeping Into Domestic Spying
and Enforcement?, Wall St. J., Mar. 9, 2004, at B 1.
146. See Press Release, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command,
INSCOM Concludes Review of Events at University of Texas Law School (Mar.
12, 2004), availableathttp://www.fas.org/irp/news/2004/03/inscom031204.pdf.
147. Poindexter was the National Security Adviser in the Reagan administration
who appeared to be at the center of the Iran-Contra Affair. His conviction for
obstruction of a congressional inquiry, false statements, and destruction of
documents was overturned on appeal on grounds that it might have been based on
immunized testimony given to a joint congressional committee investigating the
affair. United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The entire
affair is traced in Theodore Draper, A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affairs
(1991); Stephen Dycus et al., National Security Law 473-522 (3d ed. 2002); and
Lawrence E. Walsh, Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra
Matters (1993).

2004]

STEPHENDYCUS

803

(TIA). 14 8 Developed in collaboration with the Army's Intelligence
and Security Command, TIA was officially described as
a research and development program that will integrate
advanced collaborative and decision support tools; language
translation; and data search, pattern recognition, and privacy
protection technologies into an experimental prototype
network focused on combating terrorism through better
analysis and decision making.149
In practical terms, it was supposed to enable intelligence officials to
"data-mine an indefinitely expandable universe ofdatabases" in order
to "analyze, detect, classify, and identify foreign terrorists."' 5 °
Collecting data from government as well as public and private
sources, TIA programs would automatically recognize patterns of
behavior, like the purchase of bomb-making materials, or improbable
medical activity, such as treatment for anthrax symptoms, that might
suggest terrorist activity. These programs would also use biometric
recognition technologies to identify individuals by, for example, their
facial features or walking gait. And they would do all this on a
continuing, real-time basis in order to provide prompt warnings of
potential terrorist threats.
DARPA is not an intelligence agency, and it does not collect
intelligence. Products developed by DARPA are used not only by the
military, but also by other agencies and consumers outside the
government. (For example, DARPA, not Al Gore, invented the
Internet.) Moreover, data-mining technologies are in use or under
development in at least six other agencies.15 Still, the Defense
Department's association with a program to compile extensive
electronic records on the American public-telephone calls, social
148. The program is described in Dep't of Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency, Report to Congress Regarding the Terrorism Information Awareness
Program: In Response to Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-7, Div. M, § 111(b) (May 20, 2003), available at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/profiling/tia/may03_report.pdf [hereinafter Report to
Congress on TIA]; Gina Marie Stevens, Privacy: Total Information Awareness
Programs and Related Information Access, Collection, and Protection Laws 1
(Cong. Res. Serv. Rep. 31-730, 2003); Dep't of Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency, Overview of the Information Awareness Office (Aug. 2, 2002),
available at http://www.fas.orglirp/agency/dod/poindexter.html; and Dep't of
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, DARPA's Information Technology
Initiative on Countering Terrorism (n.d.),
available at
http://www.sainc.comltapac/library/TerrorismInformationOverview.pdf.
149. Report to Congress on TIA, supranote 148, Executive Summary at 1.
150. Stevens, supra note 148, at 1. Confusion about the goals of TIA is
described in Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee (TAPAC), Safeguarding
Privacy in the Fight Against Terrorism 15-20 (Mar. 2004) [hereinafter TAPAC].
151. Stevens, supra note 148, at 3.
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interactions, bank transactions, medical data, credit card purchases, and
more-struck some as particularly threatening. Others expressed
concern that the contemplated use of the technology for domestic1 52law
enforcement seemed inconsistent with the Posse Comitatus Act.
In an effort to allay public fears, DARPA renamed the program
Terrorism Information Awareness. But without clear limits on
targeting or on sharing of information (DARPA said the program
would rely on existing laws and developing technology to protect
privacy and civil liberties), Congress barred its deployment in early
2003, at least against United States persons inside the United States,
pending a report to Congress on how it balanced security against
privacy. 5 3 Then in the FY 2004 DOD Appropriations Act Congress
eliminated funding for the majority of TIA's program components."
Yet in December 2003 a number of DOD commands and
intelligence services were continuing to develop and test TIA
technologies.155 TIA also appears to live on in programs like Novel
Intelligence from Massive Data (NLMD), another device for analyzing
giant databases now resident in an obscure agency housed at NSA
headquarters called Intelligence Community Advanced Research and
Development Activity (ARDA). 5 6 NIMD is supposed to be capable of
processing a "petabyte" or more ofdata, an amount equal to forty pages
of text for every member of the human race.'57
A different agency controlled by the Pentagon, the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (formerly National Imagery and
Mapping Agency), is currently using satellite surveillance to conduct
what it calls an "urban data inventory" that describes physical features
throughout the country down to the house level.' 58 If home ownership
or residency records were integrated into the mapping database,
together with data about national origin and political affiliation, it could
help to keep track of the movements of individuals for reasons having
nothing to do with either homeland defense or homeland security.
152. See, e.g., Letter from Sen. Chuck Hagel to Joseph E. Schmitz, Inspector
General, Dept. of Defense (Dec. 2, 2002), reproducedin Department of Defense,
Office of the Inspector General, Information Technology Management: Terrorism
Information Awareness Program (Dec. 12, 2003) [hereinafter Information
Technology Management].
153. Pub. L. No. 108-7, Div. M, § 111(b), 117 Stat. 11, 534-36 (2003).
154. Pub. L. No. 108-87, § 8131, 117 Stat. 1054, 1102(2003). A useful critique
may be found in Information Technology Management, supra note 152.
155. Information Technology Management, supra note 152, at 2.
156. See Advanced Research and Development Activity, Novel Intelligencefrom
Massive Data,at http://ic-arda.org/Novel-Intelligence/index.html.
157. Michael J. Sniffen, ControversialTerrorResearch Lives On, Associated
Press, Feb. 23, 2004.
158. William M. Arkin, Mission Creep HitsHome, L.A. Times, Nov. 23, 2003,
at M2. See also Supporting Homeland Security, supranote 3, at 10-11.
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Whenever a military agency uses military technology (or any
other kind, for that matter) to control the collection and use of data,
it may be possible automatically to prevent the acquisition of
information that is not relevant to the military's homeland defense
mission. Any data collected might have personally identifiable
information suppressed, unless and until an apparent terrorist threat
is detected.' 59 Then, some say, intelligence personnel should obtain
a Title Il warrant or FISA order to discover the identity of persons
concerned."6 There is wide agreement that such programs ought to
create tamp6er-proof audit trails and be subjected to vigorous
Nevertheless, there is no indication that data mining
oversight.'
programs currently in use by military intelligence components do any
of these things.
E. A New DODIntelligence Secretariat
The 2003 DOD Authorization Act created a new Under Secretary
of Defense for Intelligence. 62 He or she is responsible for
coordination and management of all the Pentagon's intelligence
services, including the Defense Intelligence Agency, National
Security Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence divisions of the
service branches and unified commands, as well as support for
homeland defense. 63 The new Under Secretary is also supposed to
ensure that the Defense Department has an "effective
64 working
Intelligence.
Central
of
Director
the
with
relationship"
Some believe that DOD sought this new position to prevent the
loss of control over these agencies to an Intelligence Czar
(presumably the DCI), who would operate all intelligence services not
strictly military. 65 Others speculate that it will enable the Pentagon
159. This recommendation is set forth in TAPAC, supra note 150, at 50; Paul
Rosenzweig, ProposalsforImplementing the Total InformationAwareness System
2, 14 (Heritage Fdn. Legal Memorandum No. 8, Aug. 7, 2003).
160. TAPAC, supra note 150, at 52; Rosenzweig, supranote 159, at 15-16.
161. TAPAC, supra note 150, at 50, 52-53, 55; Rosenzweig, supra note 159,
at 19-22.
162. Pub. L. No. 107-314, § 901, 116 Stat. 2458, 2465 (2002).
163. See Deputy Sec. of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Excerpt of Memorandum:
Implementation Guidance on Restructuring Defense Intelligence - and Related
Matters (May 8, 2003), available at http://www.intelligence.gov/0usdimemo.shtml; Supporting Homeland Security, supra note 3, at 3.
164. Supporting Homeland Security, supra note 3, at 3.
165. See, e.g., Linda Robinson, In the Intelligence Wars, A Pre-emptive Strike
by the PentagonSurprises Many in Congress,U.S. News & World Rep., Aug. 12,
2002, at 18. See also Chris Strohm, Defense Officials Oppose Overhaul of
Intelligence Community, GovExec.com, Apr. 7, 2004, at
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to exert greater influence than previously over a large segment of the
intelligence community. 166
Recent congressional testimony by the current Under Secretary,
Stephen A. Cambone, described a "horizontal integration" strategy
that includes
a planned "system-of-systems" that integrates surveillance
capabilities across the various human and technical
disciplines and national, theater, tactical, and commercial
programs. This provides the mechanism to share information
across the enterprise-increasing the likelihood that events
can be correlated and fused to increase
the accuracy,
167
timeliness, and value of intelligence.
Whether the "horizontal integration" and "system-of-systems" will
include increased domestic collection and exchange of data by
military intelligence services is unclear.
The FY 2003 DOD Authorization Act also created a new
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. This official
is responsible for overall supervision of the department's homeland
security activities, and she is to serve as the Pentagon's liaison with
the Department of Homeland Security and National Security
Council. 68 The division of responsibilities between the two new
secretariats regarding domestic counterterrorism intelligence has not
yet been revealed, however.
VI. CONCLUSION: "GOVERNMENTS LONG ESTABLISHED SHOULD
69
NOT BE CHANGED FOR LIGHT AND TRANSIENT CAUSES" 1

We have no direct evidence that the military intelligence services
today are listening in on Americans' phone conversations, reading our
email, tracking our contributions to charities, or infiltrating activist
organizations. But in the current climate of fear spawned by the
attacks of September 11, and given the Defense Department's
commitment to keep us safe from another attack, it could happen
again.17 ° It would simply be naive to ignore the lessons of the 1960s.
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0404/040704c 1.htm.
166. See Vernon Loeb, New Intelligence Post ConsolidatesRumsfeld's Clout,
Wash. Post, Nov. 18, 2002.
167. Intelligence,Surveillance & Reconnaissance:HearingBefore the Strategic
Forces Subcomm. of the Senate Armed Services Comm., 108th Cong. (2004)

(statement of Stephen A. Cambone, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence).
168. Pub. L. No. 107-314, § 902(a), 116 Stat. 2458, 2621 (2002).
Supporting Homeland Security, supra note 3, at 2-3.
169. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

See

170. Some potential dangers are described in Richard H. Kohn, Using the
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There is nothing "light and transient" about the threat of another
terrorist attack, of course. Maybe an adjustment in our thinking about
the appropriate domestic role of military intelligence is needed. If so,
it should follow a determination that strengthening and refining the
civilian intelligence agencies will not accomplish the same purpose.
We should also be satisfied that the Department of Homeland
Security's IAIP or TTIC could not furnish all the data needed for
domestic military operations. Any such adjustment should be the
product of a robust public debate, probably culminating in legislation.
If we do accept such a change, we must also adopt reliable
controls and measures to provide accountability. We might, for
example, want to require the approval of a neutral magistrate, say one
specially trained in security matters, for military investigations where
a Title III warrant or FISA order would not be required. We might
want to strictly limit the dissemination of military intelligence
information based on particular defined needs, or to limit the
acquisition of data by military intelligence components to matters
bearing directly on homeland defense. And we might require a
periodic review of such data in military intelligence agency files in
order to expunge whatever is not accurate and currently relevant to
the agency's mission. Finally, we ought to have some clear idea
about when we can expect to abandon these changes and return to
earlier understandings.
Even if no important changes are adopted, we urgently need to
clarify our current understandings about how military intelligence
activities at home should affect the balance between security and
liberty. A recent Congressional Research Service report argues that
the "main stumbling block" to better coordination and response
between the FBI and the military is the "numerous and often
confusing statutory and regulatory authorities that govern the use of
the military in a domestic situation." '' Clarifying these authorities,
it says, could allow a more effective use of military forces while
ensuring respect for civil liberties and law enforcement concerns. 72
The same could be said for almost every law, directive, executive
order, and regulation touching the domestic work of military
intelligence. If we fail to clearly articulate and harmonize these
various authorities we will be more vulnerable than we need to be to
another terrorist attack.
We will also invite well-meaning
compromises to some of our most treasured American values.

Militaryat Home: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 4 Chi. J. Int'l L. 165 (2003).
171. Brake, supranote 77, at 20.
172. Id.

